Abstract-Technology evolves quickly. Low cost and readyto-connect devices are designed to provide new services and applications for a better people's daily life. Smart grids or smart healthcare systems are some examples of such applications all of them in the context of smart cities. In this all-connectivity scenario, some security issues arise since the larger is the number of connected devices the bigger is the surface attack dimension. This way, new solutions to monitor and detect security events are needed addressing new challenges coming from this scenario that are, among others, the number of devices to monitor, the huge amount of data to manage and the real time requirement to provide a quick security event detection and, consequently, quick attack reaction. In this work, the MSNM-Sensor is introduced, a practical and ready-to-use tool to monitor and detect security events able to manage this kind of environments. Although it is in its early development stages, experimental results based on the detection of well known attacks in hierarchical network systems proof its suitability to be applied in more complex scenarios like the ones found in smart cities or IoT ecosystems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Several technical reports forecast of 30 billion IoT (Internet of Things) devices around the world by 2021 and [1] more than 3 billions of M2M (Machine to Machine) connections by 2022 [2] . This scenario enables new services and applications for a better people's daily life as well as business opportunities. However, many challenges arise, being security one of the most important one. The way to monitor and control what is happening in these kind of scenarios is a great challenge since the attack exposure surface grows almost exponentially with the number of devices inter-connected. A more challenging problem is about how to manage the generated data gathered from different information sources such as the applications and networking devices and communications, among others. In this way, key aspects like managing volume, veracity or velocity of the data are crucial for a for quick and efficient detection and reaction responses against security attacks. Furthermore, these aspects may limit the practical application of the solutions, and specially, in the described scenario.
To address the previous issues presented in IDS (Intrusion Detection System), SIEM (System Information and Event Management) tools are widely used by the specialized community on ICT security (Information and Communication Technologies). IDS systems falls into three categories: (1) Network-based IDS (NIDS), (2) Host-based IDS (HIDS) for network communication and (3) endpoint monitoring and detection, respectively. Along with this categories we can also discern between Anomaly-based IDS (AIDS) or Signaturebased IDS (SIDS), depending on the detection technique applied. The first one (AIDS) tries to find anomalous patterns in the monitored information, while the second one (SIDS) is intends to detect the presence of an attack comparing the gathered information with previously defined attack signatures. Snort [3] or Zeek (Bro) [4] describe some use application examples of practical and widely used IDS tools.
About the SIEMs, these kind of tools also include monitoring and detection functionalities, but also provide services for event correlation and reporting capabilities, among others. Moreover, SIEMs can also manage information collected from IDS systems as a suitable data source for alerting security events. Splunk [5] or AlientVault [6] are some examples of practical and widely used SIEM tools.
However, neither IDSs nor SIEMs can efficiently manage new monitoring and security event detection requirements that arise from new communication paradigms and ecosystems, such as IoT ecosystems. To address this issue, we present in this paper MSNM-S (Multivariate Statistical Network Monitoring-Sensor), a hybrid A-IDS (i.e. solution that merges NIDS and HIDS main functionalities). MSNM-S is a ready to use tool that enable the management of complex architectures, for monitoring and security event detection in real time. This proposal is based on the research presented in Maciá-Fernández et al. [7] . The main aim of MSNM-S is to reduce the network monitoring traffic without losing performance, a key point in hierarchical network architectures and systems/ecosystems, like IoT ecosystems. In order to achieve these goals they use the so-called monitoring statistics, Qst and D-st, widely used in MSPC (Multivariate Statistical Process Control) for industrial processes as we will see in Section II.
The main features of the MSNM-S are described as follow: 1) Management of the different and heterogeneous data sources in real time. 2) Reduce, prominently, the network monitoring traffic, but keeping the anomaly detection performance. Against current IDS and SIEM based solutions fed with raw data, MSNM-S just use two real numbers, the monitoring statistics, to monitor the whole system. 3) Is scalable, versatile, distributed and dynamically adaptable to changes in the involved environments, which is a relevant issue when dealing with network communications. 4) An easy-to-use front-end, through a interactive and useful dashboard to control the whole system under monitoring. 5) It is an open-source project. MSNM-S current version is released under GPL license and we encourage the readers to be an active part of the project which is available at [8] .
The paper has been organized has follows. Section II describes the theoretical fundamentals of multivariate statistical analysis, which supports the core functionality of the sensor. Section III describes the components and operation modes of the sensor to be addressed. In Section IV, we build a realistic and controlled system to validate the anomaly detection capabilities in the sensor in complex and hierarchical environments. Moreover, attacks like DoS, data exfiltration or port scanning are successfully detected and located in the proposed network architecture as test. Finally, conclusions and further work are described in Section V.
II. FUNDAMENTALS OF MULTIVARIATE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
In this section we briefly introduce the fundamentals of multivariate statistical analysis which is the basis of the MSNM-S tool.
A. PCA: Principal Components Analysis
PCA has been proposed to reduce data size (data compression). PCA identifies a number of linear combinations of the original variables in a data set X, the so-called Principal Components (PCs), containing most of its relevant information (variability). This is a change of variables from the original ones in the X space to the PCs subspace. If X is a data matrix with M variables associated with a given phenomenon and N observations of each variable, PCA reduces its dimension from M variables to A PCs by finding the A-dimensional latent subspace of most variability captured.
PCA is described through the next equation:
where P A is the M ×A loading matrix, T A is the N ×A score matrix and E A is the N ×M residual matrix. The maximum variance directions are obtained from the eigenvectors of X T · X, and they are ordered as the columns of P A by the explained variance. The rows of T A are the projections of the original N observations in the new latent sub-space. E A is the matrix that contains the residual error, and it plays a key role in the anomaly detection, as shown afterwards. The projection (score) on the PCA subspace of a new observation is obtained as follows:
where x new is a 1×M vector to represent a new object; and t new is a 1×A vector to represent the projection of the latent subspace.
The number of PCs in a model, A, can be selected using several methods, including cross-validation [9] [10].
B. Multivariate statistical process control
One of the most common applications of PCA is process monitoring and anomaly detection and diagnosis, often referred as MSPC (Multivariate Statistical Network Monitoring). In a MSPC system, Q-st [11] and D-st (also known as T 2 ) [12] statistics are the most used techniques. Q-st compresses the residuals in each observation and D-st is computed from the scores. With both statistics computed from the calibration data under normal conditions, control limits can be established with a certain confidence level [13] . Therefore, new data are monitored using these limits. An anomaly is identified when the limits are exceeded. Furthermore, the contribution of the variables to a detected anomaly can be investigated with the contribution plots [14] .
The Q-st and D-st statistics for a specific observation can be computed through the following equations:
where τ an represents the score of the n-th observation of the a-th latent variable, µ a and σ a stand for the mean and standard deviation for the scores of that variable in the calibration data, respectively, and e nm represents the residual value corresponding to the n-th observation of the m-th variable.
III. MULTIVARIATE STATISTICAL NETWORK MONITORING-SENSOR: MSNM-S
The developed tool is based on the so-called MSNM-S (Multivariate Statistical Network Monitoring-Sensors) throughout a interconnected systems.
MSNM-S acronym comes from the MSNM approach recently coined by Camacho et al. [13] , as the functional core of each sensor. Such module relies on the use of PCA and MSPC techniques to compute the previously mentioned Qst and D-st statistics for network monitoring and anomaly detection. Although MSNM proposes a new methodology method for network anomaly detection, the use of PCA and MSPC multivariate techniques have been addressed in previous works for similar purposes. For instance, the work presented in Magán-Carrión et al. [15] , where the authors detect data anomalies in WSNs (Wireless Sensor Networks) and mitigate these anomalies with a multivariate statistical based missing data imputation.
In the following section, MSNM-S modules are introduced and deeply explained. In addition, some examples about how the system works are also presented. Figure 1 shows the involved MSNM-S functional modules. These are: 1) IS (Information Source) Module: Easily guess from its name, the IS module takes care of the data coming from the information sources to be afterward processed. Two types of data sources, according to their location, are considered:
A. MSNM-S Modules
• Local (LIS). The information incoming from these data sources is generated or accessed from the device where MSNM-S is deployed. For instance, local information sources can be obtained from IDS (Intrusion Detection Systems) or firewall log files, netflow traffic flows, host based information (e.g. syslog in Linux based systems), among others. LIS are processed by the PARSER module for information homogenization, feature engineering and feature extraction.
• Remote (RIS). The incoming data from other MSNM-S are treated as remote information source. Most of the data coming from other MSNM-S will be the computed values of the monitoring statistics Q n,m -st and Q n,mst thus allowing the anomaly detection in hierarchical and complex systems. However, some other information could be obtained from a remote sensor e.g., those asked by the security analyst for an anomaly diagnosis.
2) PARSER:
In complex and heterogeneous systems it is common to have different data sources coming from, for example, network traffic, host based data information, etc. In order to monitor such kind of systems it is necessary to process, fuse and homogenize all the data sources in a common structure to be afterward used to train and test models for anomaly detection or attack classification. This process is commonly called feature engineering. For that, the PARSER module is in charge of it by using the FaaC approach (Feature-as-a-Counter) [13] . FaaC transform the original variable space, built from different data sources, in a new one where the new variables are counters of the original. For instance, it would be good to count how many connections to port 80 we had in a certain time window. Consequently, a high value could indicate that a DoS attack is happening. FaaC approach has successfully been tested in previous works together with PCA modeling [7] [16].
3) MSNM: This is the sensor functional core. It provides multivariate statistical based methods and algorithms to compute the monitoring statistics Q n,m -st and D n,m -st in almost real time. It allows to detect anomalies in the supervised system when statistics computed from new observation exceed certain control limits. Interested readers can find detailed information about these methods at the reference work [13] .
Three are the main MSNM module operations:
• Pre-processing. It performs data pre-processing for both, new observations and data models. The standard normalization is used by default, though additional methods are also available.
• Modeling. It is in charge of the sensor calibration from a set of observations which are, ideally, in NOC (Normal Operation Condition) conditions i.e., without known anomalies. Currently, PCA model is used but other machine learning based techniques can be easily integrated [17][18] . This model is afterwards used for monitoring and detecting anomalous behaviors.
• Monitoring. This module computes the above mentioned statistics for each incoming observation. Together with a pre-computed control limits, the monitoring module is able to detect anomalous behavior when these limits are exceeded. MSPC based techniques are used in the previous operations. 4) COM (COMmunications): COM module allows each MSNM-S to exchange information. This way, it is in charge of receiving and sending specific messages. The system contemplates (but it is not limited) two types of messages: data and command. They mainly differs in the payload and type. For example, data message can include whichever the information needed in sensor operations e.g., the monitoring statistics. Instead, command messages are devised to control such an processes.
Depicted in Fig. 1 two information flows are clearly differentiated: monitoring and diagnosis. It is worth to mention that just the first one is currently implemented being the second one an ongoing work (see the project at [8] ). However, we decide to mention and describe both of them because they are complementary. This way, monitoring information flow exchange data messages containing the computed statistics Q n,m and D n,m , while the diagnosis flow controls the entire diagnosing procedure.
At this early stage, there is no specific routing algorithm among sensors. Instead, each sensor must know to whom they send and from who the data should be received. It is a manually configuration procedure. A self-discovery sensor process will be added in future releases.
Both flows and the exchanged messages will be described in Sections III-B and III-C.
5) DIAGNOSIS:
After detecting something anomalous in the system it is time to investigate where the event come from and why. This task, the diagnosis procedure, is manually carried out by a security analyst who was alerted by the system.
The diagnosis procedure could be a tricky and tedious work because sometimes there are too much information to analyze. Even more difficult is to diagnose anomalies when the monitoring systems covers not only few parts of the system but a complete network architecture. This is our battle field and how to manage this problem is the duty of the DIAGNOSIS module.
The DIAGNOSIS module relies on the use of statistical multivariate techniques (but it is not limited to) to determine which are the source of the anomaly. Currently, the oMEDA (observation-based Missing-data method for Exploratory Data Analysis) [19] method is implemented, though some others methods can be easily included, for example, the diagnosis method proposed by the authors in [20] and the others they compare inside.
Although the DIAGNOSIS module solves the anomaly diagnostic by itself, it is locally done. Nevertheless, what would happens if the anomaly comes from a remote source, for example, from hosts at the deepest level of the hierarchy?. Determining what data source/s are involved in an anomalous behavior previously detected at central monitoring console is not a trivial task. For this reason, we create the DRT (Diagnosis Routing Table) which acts similarly to the well known routing IP tables but adding the information of local and remote sources. The diagnosis flow and routing will be in details explained in Sections III-B and III-C. 6) MANAGER: As can be seen in Fig. 1 , all modules work together waiting for or passing the inner information that they need. When and how this information exchange should be at specific module (those in the gray filled rectangle in the figure) is leading by this module.
Previously mentioned, two different information flows are differentiated: monitoring and diagnosis. The first one, involves three main modules (IS, PARSER and MSNM) that should be invoked one after another because the previous output acts as input of the next. However, the second one involves the DIAGNOSIS module which is invoked if certain message has been received. Orchestrating when and how each MSNM-S module should run is the duty of the MANAGER.
A more detailed description of the modules interactions, data exchanged and the role of the MANAGER at each sensor functional modes will be shown in Section III-B.
B. MSNM-S Operations
Above, the main functional MSNM-S modules were described. However, high level operations including several modules are devised in accordance to the principal MSNM-S functionalities: monitoring and diagnosis. As mentioned before, the diagnosis process is still an ongoing work so just the monitoring operation will be detailed in the following.
1) Monitoring Operation: To be aware of what is happening in systems or networks is of crucial importance to detect anomalous behaviors (intended or not). This is the principal function of the MSNM-S sensor, without it there were no detection at all. However it is not a trivial task since a previous work must be done to select what element and information should be supervised. For that, the monitoring flow and the involved modules, offer a versatile and scalable tool allowing the user to freely select data sources and variables to be monitored. Because of that we are able 1) to process less information so reducing the computation time which is a key point for real time applications, and 2), to adapt the monitoring time step granularity, sometimes hardly limited by the monitored data source or the anomaly to be detected. As will be shown in the Section IV, 60 seconds is enough to monitor a netflow based data sources in the detection of DoS attacks, for example.
For each b vk batch of observations a new one is generated by parsing and aggregating the original information (raw). This task is the duty of PARSER (see III-A2). At the time of writing this article, the implemented module was the FaaC (Feature as a Counter) parser [21] .
Although just one data source is considered until now, additional local (LIS) or remote (RIS) ones can also be added. Figure 2 shows the addition procedure. In this case (but not limited), three are the data sources involved: two local (LIS v and LIS l ) and one remote (RIS r ). At each monitoring step a new concatenated observation is built. Now, the extended space will have e variables being e = z + p + 2 where z is the number of variables (counters) from a batch k of source LIS v ; p is the number of variables (counters) from the same batch of source LIS l ; and RIS r has two variables as the number of statistics generated by the remote sensor. This observation is the input of MSNM module (see III-A3) which is in charge of to compute the monitoring statistics (Q (n,m)k , D (n,m)k ). At this point one can detect anomalous behaviors when the control limits are exceeded by them. Additionally, if this sensor is not the root in hierarchy the generated statistics will be also sent to the corresponding remote sensor for hierarchical monitoring and anomaly detection.
C. Working all together: A hierarchical approach
Aforementioned, a single MSNM-S instance is able to monitor and detect anomalous behaviors from a wide range of heterogeneous local and remote data sources. However the really novel idea behind the use of Q (n,m) and D (n,m) statistics is their capability of keeping the monitoring and anomaly detection performance when aggregating them in hierarchical and complex network environments.
Although the tool will be tested in Section IV in a realistic network scenario, an example of several MSNMSs cooperating within a hypothetical and common network deployment will be shown in the following for a better understanding. For that, Fig. 3 shows a simple network scenario where several MSNM-Ss are deployed at hosts and network devices. We can discern in the figure, two involved information flows: monitoring and diagnosis flow. The former (black dashed lines) transports pairs of monitoring statistics ([Q (n,m) , D (n,m) ]) coming from lower to higher levels in the hierarchy. In this specific example, sensors S 1,3 , · · · , S n,3 , deployed at hosts in the deepest architecture level, send the 3) ] to the next closest sensor in the hierarchy. Indeed, they act as remote sources of S 1,2 . Now, this sensor aggregates and processed it giving the [Q (1, 2) , D (1, 2) ] values. Finally, the root sensor (S 1,1 ) gathers the statistical information from its immediately lower levels, processes it and generates the last statistics to be observed for anomaly detection. This final monitoring task is commonly carried out by a security analyst who determines the presence of an anomaly when certain control limits are exceeded by the statistics [13] .
Once the anomaly is detected, a deeper inspection should be done to determine, for example, where the anomaly comes from and why. This is the so-called diagnosis procedure that is represented in Fig. 3 with solid green and dashes brown lines, command and response involved actions respectively 1 . In this example, the anomaly comes from S 1,3 which is in charge of monitoring firewall traffic logs. First, a command message [C m ] for finding the anomaly origin is sent. How this message should be routed across the multi-level scenario is defined in the DRT (Diagnosis Routing Table) which maps RISs and LISs data sources known by each MSNM-S. However, who is in charge of determining which source motivates the anomaly at specific observation for finding it in the DRT? As mentioned before, the diagnosis algorithm is called for that purpose. Currently oMEDA [19] is ready to be used, though some others methods could easily be integrated. This procedure is repeated until the origin data source is found. After that, the involved piece of information (raw) falling into the observation period of time is returned to the root sensor to be analyzed in details. A new message called response [R m ] allows this operation. 
A. Experimental environment
In order to evaluate the performance of IDS based systems, pre-defined and -build datasets are widely used. Consequently, choosing one or another is a very relevant decision having strong consequences, not only on the obtained results, but also on the confidence of the conclusions the authors claim. In this sense, Maciá-Fernández et al. [22] build an recent and real network dataset that copes with the main drawbacks found in previous ones. Nevertheless, not all of them are valid to be used in certain application scenarios because of the existing differences between the environment where the dataset was built and the one where the IDS solution will be deployed. One can think, for example, on smart city scenarios or IoT ecosystems with a lot of different involved devices and communications. Because of the previous reasons self-adaptable, ready to use solutions for real time anomaly detection are recommended. These type of approaches could eliminates the need of using previously gathered datasets which are, on the other hand, very hard to build.
To validate the monitoring and anomaly detection performance of MSNM-S in complex systems, we will spread several of them over a controlled scenario with virtual machines running in a cluster. This scenario has previously been devised to theoretically proof the hypothesis of the application of MSNM for hierarchical systems [7] . The key characteristics of that will be introduced in the following though interested readers get more details in the mentioned reference.
The complete scenario with the different machines is depicted in Figure 4 . This environment simulates a typical network architecture of a corporation. That is why we can observe several sub-networks, network devices and enddevices. For instance, a DMZ is located at the inner network, separated from the outside world (Internet) with a Border Router (BR) and departmental networks in turn delimited by the corresponding routers (R1, R2, R3).
In this scenario, we have two type of network traffic: normal and malicious. The former, comprise all HTTP communications from all departmental end devices requesting HTTP resources allocated at the several web servers placed in Internet and DMZ. As it is can be seen on Figure 4 , BR is aware of all the incoming and ongoing traffic to the Internet. On the other hand, Rx routers with x = 1, 2, 3, observe the corresponding portion of the previous HTTP traffic which is generated by the host in their bu-networks. Additionally, departmental hosts request HTTP resources to the webserver in the DMZ.
In respect to the malicious traffic, it is generated from different locations in the predefined architecture simulating very well known and state of the art attacks. They are: DoS (high and low rate); port scanning, a relevant step on the recognise phase in a penetration testing procedure; and data exfiltration for privacy violation purposes.
We run our scenario during a period of 25 hours. During the first 23.5 hours, only normal traffic is generated. During the last hour and a half, the attacks previously described are generated sequentially and not overlapped in time during 5 minutes each: high rate DoS, low rate DoS, scanning attack and data exfiltration.
The different routers in the network (R1, R2, R3 and BR) are equipped with Netflow inspectors that generates Netflow v5 information. Such data is afterwards in real time consumed by the corresponding MSNM-S which are deployed in the mentioned network devices. These sensors are S 1,2 , S 2,2 , S 2,3 and S 1,1 which are represented by orange boxes in Figure 4 . All of them only consider a local data source: the generated information of the corresponding netflow inspectors. However, only S 1,1 is also in charge of aggregates the monitoring information in the form of statistics coming from the sensors in the network lower level. Every minute a new observation is gathered by each sensor meaning that two statistics are generated every minute too.
B. Experimental results
As we stated in the previous sections a key characteristic of the MSNM-S is its application in real and complex environments to monitor a huge variety of devices and communications. Even more, the MSNM-S system is able to detect abnormal behaviors in the whole system just considering a couple of monitoring statistics. This is what we are going to demonstrate in the following 2 . Figure 5 shows the Q-st (blue inverted triangles) and D-st (orange filled circles) statistics evolution with time got from the BR sensor. Besides, upper control limits are also shown for Q-st (UCLq) represented by a green dashed line and for D-st (UCLd) in turn represented by a red continuos line. Subfigure 5(a) shows the statistics values for the total duration of the experiment while Subfigure 5(b) is showing the last 1.5 hours where the attacks were launched. In the first subfigure one we can discern between three different intervals. In the first one we are experiencing a high false positive rate which is caused by the initial random calibration of the sensor. Each sensor uses the EWMA (Exponentially Weighted Moving Average) approach to dynamically calibrate the sensors every 60 mins [23] . The second one covers almost all the experiment time and we can see the effectiveness of the dynamic adaptation of the sensor to the environment because the computed values are below the control limits almost all the time. Finally, the third one, which shows a clear deviation in the normal behavior of the statistics and the system in general. In this period, the control limits are undoubtedly exceeded indicating that something anomalous is happening.
Apart from the previous global results, it is worth to pay special attention to the attack period of time. For that, Subfigure 5(b) shows clear deviations of the statistics values when the attacks are taking place. From DoS (high and low rate) to data exfiltration, the MSNM-S sensor approach is able to detect anomalous behaviors coming from different parts of the whole systems just taking into account two simple numerical values. Even more, we can also distinguish where the anomaly is coming from by inspecting similar monitoring graphics but, in these case, computed from each of the involved router. It is can be seen in Figures 6, 7 and 8 for the sensors deployed at R1, R2 and R3 respectively. For example, by means of the inspection of the R3 monitoring graph we can conclude that the attack in originated somewhere in the R3 network. Similarly, for R1 and R2 for port scanning and data exfiltration attacks, respectively. How to unveil the exact origin of the anomaly can be addressed by the diagnosis procedure which is currently on development. Additionally, one can see the dynamic adaptation on the sensor to the changes in the environment. It is more evident in R3 (see Figure 8) .
Although the previous figures are included in the text for the sake of clarification, it is worth to mention that the MSNM-S application comes with a specific and interactive dashboard. Thanks to it the security analyst of application operator can, in real time, access to the previous information and the logical connections of the sensors as well. An snapshot of the monitoring main section of the tool is shown in Figure  9 . On the one hand, the upper part is showing the logical connections created among the sensor. The operator can see in it the direction of the monitoring flow. In this specific scenario, it is clearly shown how sensors in routers R1, R2 and R3 are configured to send their monitoring information to the BR. On the other hand, the monitoring graphs will appear in the bottom part by clicking on a specific sensor. Among other actions, the operator can interact with these graphs to pause/play the updating procedure for a better inspection. The dashboard is really needed in whatever the monitoring system that allows the operator to reduce the response/reaction time when an attack is taking place.
V. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK
This work introduces the MSNM-S, a practical and readyto-use tool to monitor and detect security events able to manage complex systems and network environments. MSNMSensor cope with new the technological challenges arising from the all-connectivity scenario where millions of devices are interconnected and sharing information.
MSNM-S has successfully been tested in hierarchical network systems to monitor and detect well known network attacks.
Implementing the anomaly diagnosis are one of our future improvements. Additionally, the MSNM-S capabilities should be tested in more complex environment e.g., IoT ecosystems or those found in smart cities.
